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Abstract
On 18 February 2019, China released the 'Development Plan Outline for 
the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA)'. This study 
presents the most up-to-date analysis on the GBA, including its history, 
importance and institutional arrangement; its signiﬁcance vis-à-vis the in-
tegration of Hong Kong and Macau to China, to the One Belt One Road 
initiative, to the Made in China 2025 plan and to China's wider economic 
growth; and offers a prediction on the GBA's future and the challenges ahead. 
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On 18 February 2019, the 'Development Plan Outline for the Guang-
dong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA)' (hereafter referred 
to as 'the Outline') was unveiled. This plan was released by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Coun-
cil (China's cabinet). It sets both near-term and long-term development 
objectives for the region. The plan says that by 2022, the framework for 
an international ﬁrst-class bay area and world-class city region should 
be formed; by 2035, the region should have an economic system and 
mode of development mainly supported by innovation (Wu 2019).
The GBA consists of 11 municipalities, nine of which are located in 
Mainland China (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, Zhuhai, 
Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Zhaoqing and Huizhou) and two are Special 
Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macao). It can be considered 
a city-region, deﬁned as one which comprises any major metropolitan 
area, or contiguous set of metropolitan areas, together with a surround-
ing hinterland – itself a locus of scattered urban settlements – whose 
internal economic and political affairs are intricately bound up with 
far-ﬂung and intensifying extranational relationships (Scott 2001). A city-
region is characterized by the spatial extent of closely linked economic 
activity, rather than just the 'city' itself or the jurisdictional deﬁnition 
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of the settlement. A similar concept is the city/urban cluster (Jha 2019), 
deﬁned as a geographic concentration of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular ﬁeld, linked by commonalities and comple-
mentarities (Porter 1998). 
While there are expanding literatures on supranational regional 
integration, microregionalism refers to processes of growing regional 
interconnectedness that occur 'below' the national level which cuts across 
national borders (Breslin and Hook 2002). The GBA is an example of 
microregionalism and has been examined by scholars before the concept 
of a GBA was formally speciﬁed. For example, Bie, Jong and Derudder 
(2015) reviewed the historical evolution of this geographic region, which 
was generally referred as the Greater Pearl River Delta, in a number of 
distinct phases and concluded that since 2014 the population, economic 
clout and mutual interconnectedness, production and R&D here have 
grown to such an extent that it can indeed be qualiﬁed as a global city-
region. Enright, Scott and Chang (2005) showed how this region ben-
eﬁted from China's economic opening up by combining the international 
orientation, business experience and ﬁnancial strength of Hong Kong 
and Macao with the land, labour and skills from Mainland China, and 
then became home to one of the world's leading manufacturing centres. 
Yang (2006) examined the geopolitics of cross-boundary governance, 
especially the power relations among multiple levels of governments 
and concerned stakeholders in this region, using the example of the 
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge. Cheung (2012) also considered the 
intergovernmental dynamics within this region using the example of the 
pursuit of a new reform and development plan by Guangdong province 
in 2008 and Hong Kong's effort to position itself in China's 12th Five-
Year Plan. Yang and Li (2013) examined the restructuring of regional 
governance since the mid-2000s, reﬂected in rescaling attempts initiated 
by the Guangdong provincial government and bottom-up resistance 
from local residents in Hong Kong, and concluded that the interaction 
of the rescaling dynamics has engendered a contested geopolitics of 
cross-boundary governance as regional integration intensiﬁes. Unlike 
other city-regions in the world, China's GBA is heavily inﬂuenced by 
top-down planning from Chinese central government. The Outline 
released in February 2019 provides new deﬁnitions and policy position-
ings towards the GBA. From this point of view, this study presents the 
most up-to-date analysis on the GBA and contributes to the academic 
literature on microregionalism. 
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Regarding studies on clusters, as argued by Wolman and Hincapie 
(2015) we know a good deal about how clusters operate but much less 
about how they are formed and, in particular, the extent to which they 
can be assisted either in their formation or in operation through pub-
lic policy. So, the natural question is, as put forward by Wolman and 
Hincapie (2015): since clusters result from natural processes – private-
sector, organic, market-driven activity – can public policy improve 
the functioning of clusters and, if so, through what means? Wolman 
and Hincapie (2015) concluded that systematic objective evaluation 
research on cluster-based economic development policy outcomes is 
badly needed. Furthermore, as argued by Bertaud (2016), China's urban 
clusters are very different from traditional forms of urbanization, and 
their size is unprecedented. The GBA will thus be a great example for 
examination. 
Moreover, this study also contributes to the interests of investors who 
are considering investing in the GBA and the related industries/com-
panies, and other stakeholders as well. 
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 1 presents an intro-
duction to the GBA, including its history, importance and institutional 
arrangement. Section 2 analyses the signiﬁcance of the GBA to China. Sec-
tion 3 looks at the future of the GBA. Section 4 concludes the article.
The GBA: Some Background Information
The concept of a GBA was ﬁrst mentioned on 28 March 2015 in the 
'Vision and Action to Promote the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road' jointly issued by China's National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Commerce. In March 2016, the GBA was further 
mentioned in the '13th Five-Year Plan Outline for National Economic 
and Social Development', which lays down the strategy and pathway 
for China's development for 2016–2020. In March 2017, the GBA was 
discussed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his 'Report on the Work 
of the Government in 2017'. On 1 July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong 
Kong's handover from Britain to China, the 'Framework Agreement on 
Promoting the Development of the GBA' was jointly assigned by China's 
National Development and Reform Commission, Guangdong Provincial 
Government, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 
and the government of the Macao Special Administrative Region. In 
March 2018, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, during his 'Report on the Work 
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of the Government in 2018', stated that the development plan outline 
would soon be released. In August 2018, Chinese central government 
established the Leading Committee for the GBA. Then on 28 October 
2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that China should do a good 
job in developing the GBA (CCTV 2018),1 indicating that the GBA has 
gained support from the highest level of Chinese state power. 
As stated previously, the GBA consists of 11 municipalities, includ-
ing Hong Kong and Macau, and nine located in Guangdong Province, 
Mainland China (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, Zhuhai, 
Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Zhaoqing and Huizhou). The geographic loca-
tion is shown in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1. China's GBA: Geographic Location
Source: The Bartlett School of Planning, University College London
Each municipality has unique characteristics. For example, while 
the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong is negligible, Hong Kong is 
an international centre for ﬁnance such as offshore Renminbi and asset 
management, logistics and trade. Hong Kong also has world-class uni-
versities. Macau's main sector is gaming and tourism, and the convention 
and exhibition business. Guangzhou is the capital and transport hub of 
Guangdong Province, with both heavy industry such as auto manufac-
turing and light industry and the service industry. Shenzhen is famous 
for its high-tech industries such as Huawei, ZTE and BYD, while lack-
ing in terms of higher education opportunities. Dongguan and Foshan 
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are major manufacturing hubs. Zhuhai mainly relies on light industry. 
The rest are relatively underdeveloped. Table 1 shows the land areas, 
populations and GDP of the various parts of the GBA.
TABLE 1. The Land Area, Population and GDP of the GBA (2017; 
Ranked by GDP)
Land area 
(km2)
Population 
million)
GDP 
(US$ bn)
Guangzhou 7,434.4 14.5 351.0
Shenzhen 1,997.5 12.5 345.4
Hong Kong 1,073.0 7.4 341.5
Foshan 3,797.7 7.7 144.3
Dongguan 2,460.0 8.3 116.4
Huizhou 11,347.0 4.8 58.8
Zhongshan 1,783.7 3.3 52.7
Macau 30.4 0.6 50.4
Jiangmen 9,505.0 4.6 41.3
Zhuhai 1,736.5 1.8 41.1
Zhaoqing 14,891.0 4.1 32.4
Total 56,056.1 69.5 1,575.3
World Rank 123 20 12
Comparison to  
China (Excluding 
Hong Kong and 
Macau)
0.6% 4.4% 9.4%
Source and note: The land area data are from the government's ofﬁcial website, and no water 
areas are included; population and GDP data are from Wind and China's National Bureau of 
Statistics. The world rank data are from the United Nations Statistics Division. GDP rank data 
are from the World Bank and United Nations. All data are as of 2017 or the most recent available. 
Table 1 shows that the total area of the GBA is around 56,056 square 
kilometres, the total population is 69.5 million and the total GDP is 
approximately US$1.58 trillion as of 2017. If considering the GBA as a 
country, it is ranked 123rd by area, 20th by population and 12th by GDP 
in the world. Its population is greater than those of the UK and France, 
just behind Turkey. Its GDP is bigger than that of Russia, Australia or 
Spain, just behind South Korea. Comparing the GBA to China (exclud-
ing Hong Kong and Macau), it only accounts for 0.6 per cent by area, 
4.4 per cent by population but 9.4 per cent by GDP. The fractions will 
fall slightly if including Hong Kong and Macau as parts of China. In 
comparison to other city-regions, the GBA is the third largest by GDP, 
behind the New York Metropolitan area (US$1.66 trillion) and the Tokyo 
bay area (US$1.77 trillion) but is the largest in terms of population.2 
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There are some institutional arrangements regarding promoting the 
development of the GBA. For example, a Leading Committee on Build-
ing the GBA was established in 2018. The team members are shown in 
Table 2.
TABLE 2. The Members of the Leading Committee on Building the GBA
Name Positions
Team 
Leader
Han Zheng
Standing Committee Member of the 
Political Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee; Vice-Premier of China
Deputy 
Team 
Leader
Li Xi
Member of the Political Bureau 
of the CPC Central Committee; 
Guangdong Provincial Party Com-
mittee Secretary
He Lifeng
Director of the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission
Team 
Member
Carrie Lam Cheng 
Yuet-ngor
Chief Executive of Hong Kong
Fernando Chui Sai 
On
Chief Executive of Macau
Zhang Xiaoming
Director of the Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs Ofﬁce, China
Wang Zhimin
Director of the Liaison Ofﬁce of the 
Chinese Central Government in 
Hong Kong
Fu Ziying
Director of the Liaison Office of 
the Chinese Central Government 
in Macau
Source: 21CNH3, 2018; Xinhua News, 2019;4 Jiang, 2019
According to the 2017 'Framework Agreement on Promoting the 
Development of the GBA', the quartet – that is, the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission, Guangdong Province, Hong Kong 
and Macau governments – will hold regular meetings every year to 
coordinate and resolve major issues in the development of the GBA. 
After the Leading Committee on Building the GBA was established, this 
committee is assumed to undertake the responsibilities of coordination 
and implementation. 
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The GBA's Signiﬁcance 
Since the GBA was initialized by and is now under the planning of 
Chinese central government, it bears the responsibility of fulﬁlling the 
objectives of the latter. Speciﬁcally, there are four policy objectives: 
further integrating Hong Kong and Macau into Mainland China; ex-
tending the One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI); further implementing 
economic structure upgrading and promoting the Made in China 2025 
programme; enhancing economic growth. In a word, the GBA initiative 
plays a signiﬁcant role in China's national strategy. 
A. Further Integrating Hong Kong and Macau into Mainland 
China
Hong Kong was ruled by Great Britain from 1842 to 1997. After 1 July 
1997, it was transferred to China under the arrangement of 'One Coun-
try, Two Systems'. Chapter 1, Article 5 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 
the constitutional document of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, reads: 'the socialist system and policies shall not be practised in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capital-
ist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years'. 
However, since Hong Kong's return to China, a majority of the 
population is pessimistic about the future (Cheng 2014). At the same 
time, localism – referring to a political movement that focuses on the 
preservation of Hong Kong's identity and autonomy – is rising. People 
of this view generally object to growing political encroachment by the 
Beijing government into Hong Kong's political, economic and social 
affairs. Trust of the Beijing government has dropped signiﬁcantly. For 
example, in late 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics, 53.1 per cent of 
respondents trusted the Beijing government, with only 14.4 per cent not 
trusting it. By the end of 2015, about 40 per cent did not trust the Beijing 
government, with only 35.2 per cent trusting it (Kwong 2016). 
In reality, Hong Kong is moving toward 'One Country, One and a Half 
Systems', and the Chinese government's approach is approaching 'One 
Country, One System' (UK Parliament 2019). One major method is through 
the cross-border integration. For example, as argued by Yang (2006), 
establishment of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
in 2003 has indicated that cross-border integration between Hong Kong 
and China has shifted authority to the central government. As the GBA 
means a deeper integration between Hong Kong, Macau and Mainland 
China, the result would be much closer to 'One Country, One System'.
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Localism in Macau is much weaker than in Hong Kong but the ap-
proaches and effects are very similar.
B. Further Promoting the BRI
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI, calling it the 
'project of the century' (Clover et al. 2017). The BRI broadly emphasizes 
cooperation in ﬁve areas: coordinating development policies; forging 
infrastructure and facilities networks; strengthening investment and 
trade relations; enhancing ﬁnancial cooperation; and deepening social 
and cultural exchanges (Johnston 2019). It is also argued that the BRI has 
emerged as the cornerstone of China's economic statecraft. Under the 
umbrella of the BRI, China seeks to promote a more connected world 
brought together by a web of Chinese-funded physical and digital 
infrastructure, which is a key tool for advancing China's geopolitical 
ambitions. Through the economic activities bundled under the BRI, 
China is pursuing a vision of the twenty-ﬁrst century deﬁned by great 
power spheres of inﬂuence, state-directed economic interactions and 
creeping authoritarianism (Kliman et al. 2019).5 
The BRI includes the Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-ﬁrst-
century Maritime Silk Road; the starting point for the latter is the GBA 
(see Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2. China's BRI and the GBA
Source: CCTV, Education University of Hong Kong
The role of the GBA is twofold. First, the Mainland China part of the 
GBA, that in Guangdong Province, is an important source of China's 
outward direct investment (ODI). For example, as of 2017, Guangdong 
accounts for 10.5 per cent of Chinese ODI stocks, while this ﬁgure was 
just 5.2 per cent in 2013.6 Guangdong Province has increasingly become 
an important source of Chinese ODI, including in BRI projects. Second, 
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Hong Kong plays a very important role in providing ﬁnancing and in-
vestment, and professional services to BRI projects. Speciﬁcally, in the 
ﬁrst place, Hong Kong as a major ﬁnancing centre can offer ﬁnancings 
for BRI projects. In 2018, Hong Kong took the top slot in global Initial 
Public Offering rankings, and more than 70 per cent of the funds raised 
came from mainland enterprises (Luo 2018). Hong Kong was ranked 
number one globally for ﬁve years for the size of initial public offer-
ings, and in the top ﬁve for four years during 2009–2017 (FSDC 2018).7 
In terms of bank loans, 70 of the world's 100 largest banks operate in 
Hong Kong, and the total banking assets are around US$3 trillion as of 
2017 (FSDC 2018). In addition, the efﬁcient and sophisticated ﬁnance 
infrastructure in Hong Kong also makes it possible to supply different 
types of sovereign bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds and other 
types of bonds from BRI. Moreover, Hong Kong is developing its green 
bond market to ﬁnance infrastructure projects with some ecological 
requirements. For example, the Hong Kong Quality Assurance Agency 
has launched a green ﬁnance certiﬁcation scheme to provide third-party 
conformity assessments for issuers on their green ﬁnancial instru-
ments by making reference to international and national standards. 
Hong Kong is also the leading offshore Renminbi (RMB) centre. As of 
December 2017, around 50 per cent of global offshore RMB deposits 
are at banks in Hong Kong (FSDC 2018). In order to promote Hong 
Kong's ﬁnancial support of the BRI, the Hong Kong Monetary Author-
ity Infrastructure Financing Facilitating Ofﬁce was established in July 
2016. As argued by Chan (2018), given the huge infrastructure demand, 
the BRI would require multiple sources and mechanisms of funding; a 
market-oriented, multitier system of ﬁnancing is the only feasible way 
to provide sustainable funding for cross-border infrastructure projects. 
Hong Kong seems to be the sole candidate in China that can fulﬁl this 
role. Next, Hong Kong can provide professional insurance and re- 
insurance services to BRI projects. For example, Hong Kong can provide 
feasibility evaluation, risk assessment, planning, design, construction, 
supervision, management and maintenance services in this area. Hong 
Kong is also able to offer services such as environmental impact assess-
ment, green building and pollution control. 
While Hong Kong alone can do these jobs for BRI projects, Hong 
Kong as a part of GBA can do an even better job. A more integrated 
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial market within the GBA will further enhance 
Hong Kong's leading role of ﬁnancial and professional services. For 
instance, for stock markets, a single market in which all major ﬁrms in 
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BRI countries are trading is assumed to be centred around Hong Kong 
(and Shenzhen). The Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing will also ben-
eﬁt from its expanding business of conducting commodities trading in 
the Qianhai SEZ located in a suburb of Shenzhen (Lau 2018). As Hong 
Kong already has the highest concentration of insurers in Asia (FSDC 
2018), and is expected to continue as a buyers' market (WTW 2018),8 a 
more integrated GBA will provide more opportunities for and further 
strengthen the insurance industry in Hong Kong.  
More importantly, the establishment of the GBA is consistent with 
the broad strategic goals set by the BRI. As discussed above, the BRI 
emphasizes the importance of forging infrastructure and facilities net-
works, through which China seeks to promote a more connected world 
brought together by a web of physical and digital infrastructure for 
advancing its geopolitical ambitions. A more integrated GBA in terms 
of infrastructure, investment and trade will naturally be connected with 
the BRI areas, thus creating a more broadly integrated world including 
both domestic and overseas markets.
C. Further Upgrading Economic Structure and Promoting the 
Made in China 2025 Programme
Table 3 shows the GDP structure by industry in the GBA. It shows that 
while the manufacturing industry in Hong Kong and Macau is almost 
negligible, manufacturing is the dominant industry in the rest of the 
GBA, in other words the nine relevant cities of Mainland China. This 
ﬁnding is consistent with that from the national-level data. For example, 
Liu (2018) found that China accounted for almost one quarter (23.6 per 
cent) of world manufacturing output in 2016, followed by the USA (15.6 
per cent), Japan (10 per cent) and Germany (6.3 per cent). China sur-
passed the USA as the leading manufacturing economy in 2010. China 
is clearly the world's largest manufacturing economy.
However, despite the clear dominant position of the manufacturing in-
dustry, it seems that this industry structure needs to be further upgraded. 
For example, RG (2019) found that manufacturing in the GBA is relatively 
lacking in high-level talent, the degree of digital integration is not high and 
the whole development model seems to be labour intensive.9 This ﬁnding 
is consistent with those based on national-level data. For example, Liu 
(2018) found that China's production and exports are still more focused 
on lower-tech manufacturing sectors than those of other countries. 
As argued by Kenderdine (2017), China's transition economy ex-
periment continues to rely heavily on state-driven industrial policy to 
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structure the economy. Accordingly, China launched Made in China 
2025, a ten-year strategic plan to comprehensively upgrade China's 
manufacturing industry. The strategic goal of Made in China 2025 is to 
make China a manufacturing powerhouse in terms of quality as well 
as quantity. It has ﬁve principles: to be innovation driven; to be high 
quality; to showcase eco-development; to achieve structural optimiza-
tion; to be talent oriented (Liu 2018). 
As a response to the Made in China 2025 programme launched by 
Chinese central government, the local governments in the GBA also 
made their own industrial policies to connect with, or 'dock', the na-
tional Made in China 2025. For example, in January 2016 the Shenzhen 
government launched the 'Shenzhen Action Plan for Docking Made in 
China 2025'. In March 2018, Guangdong Provincial government issued 
the 'Implementation Plan and Supporting Policy Measures on Deepening 
The ''Internet + Advanced Manufacturing'' and Developing Industrial 
Internet'. In November 2018, the Shenzhen government issued the 'Im-
plementation Plan on Further Accelerating the Development of Strategic 
Emerging Industries'. In July 2018, it was reported that Guangdong 
TABLE 3. The GDP Structure by Industry in the GBA (2017)
Agri-
culture
Manufac-
turing
Industrial 
Industry
Wholesale 
and Retail 
Sales
Finance 
and In-
surance
Real 
Estate
Guangzhou 1.1% / 25.4% 14.7% 9.1% 8.5%
Shenzhen 0.1% / 38.6% 10.5% 13.0% /
Zhuhai 1.8% / 42.4% / / /
Foshan 1.4% / 55.7% 6.8% 4.3% 8.9%
Jiangmen 7.0% / 46.6% 7.4% 5.0% 6.1%
Zhaoqing 15.5% / 33.5% 9.8% 3.5% 6.1%
Huizhou 4.3% / 49.6% 10.3% 4.9% 8.4%
Dongguan 0.3% / 47.1% 11.5% 6.0% 8.7%
Zhongshan 1.6% / 48.1% 9.8% 5.8% 7.7%
Hong Kong 0.1% 1.0% <2.4% 21.2% 17.5% 10.5%
Macau / 0.6% 1.3% 5.6% 6.5% 10.6%
Source: Wind Info. Accessed from https://www.wind.com.cn/en/
Note: / represents data not available. The nine mainland cities did not separately record their 
manufacturing industry. Accordingly, the industrial industry is regarded as a proxy indicator 
approximately measuring the manufacturing industry. In Hong Kong, the agricultural industry is 
recorded together with mining industry, accounting for about 0.1 per cent of GDP. The electricity, 
gas and water supply accounts for less than 1.3 per cent of GDP, so overall industrial industry 
accounts for less than 2.4 per cent. Hong Kong's wholesale and retails also includes foreign trade, 
and the real estate industry also includes professional services such as lawyers, accountants, ﬁnan-
cial advisers and consultants, among others. In Macau, electricity, gas and water supply accounts 
for 0.7 per cent of GDP, and there is no reporting on the mining industry. Therefore, the overall 
industrial industry accounts for around 1.3 per cent.
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Provincial government was working with the Hong Kong and Macau 
governments to draft a 'Science and Technology Innovation Action Plan 
for the GBA for 2018–22' (China News 2018).10 
While Liu (2018) summarized the strategies the Chinese government 
has adopted to implement the industry policies, the speciﬁc measure for 
the GBA is collaboration in areas relevant to the structural upgrading of 
Chinese manufacturing between Mainland China and Hong Kong, whose 
universities are strong in scientiﬁc research. For example, R&D collabora-
tion of the following areas is to be further strengthened (HKAES 2017):
• Advanced manufacturing including robotics; industrial integrated 
systems; new energy vehicles; intelligent automobiles; advanced 
energy storage batteries; high-end marine equipment; avionics; 
wearable devices. 
• Big Data science and e-commerce including Big Financial Data; 
cloud computing, social networking, data mining; smart city; pattern 
recognition; information security technology; sensor technology. 
• Biotechnology including pharmaceuticals; targeted drugs; chiral 
drugs and the like. 
• Environment and urban governance, including water pollution 
control; smart cities; marine pollution control; environmental moni-
toring technology; haze governance technology. 
• Energy saving and new energy, including renewables such as solar, 
wind, wave, biological power, high-efﬁciency thin-ﬁlm photovoltaic 
cells and the like. 
• Medical health including aging; disease treatment such as cancer, 
hepatitis B, diabetes mellitus, and so on. 
• New materials including nanometer material; new biomimetic 
materials.
Furthermore, a more integrated GBA will also help improve the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing industry. For example, more in-
frastructure investments (roads, ports, airports and so on) and greater 
logistics capabilities will make it easier to ﬁnd alternative suppliers and 
further improve the movement of goods. These are essential parts of 
the supply chain. The much easier access to ﬁnancing (equity, debt or 
trade-related ﬁnancing) will further help cross-border trade ﬂows in 
and out of the GBA (Qu and Lam 2018). 
D. Further Promoting Economic Growth
China's economic growth has been continuously declining since its high 
in 2007 before the global ﬁnancial crisis, when the Chinese economy 
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grew 14.2 per cent. The ﬁgure was just 6.6 per cent in 2018. As argued 
by Liu (2018), the change in China's growth trend reﬂects both cycli-
cal and structural problems but mainly the latter. The main reason for 
China's economic slowdown is the decline of its potential GDP growth 
rate, which is determined by three factors: labour, capital and total 
factor productivity. First, China's ongoing transition from a relatively 
young workforce to a more elderly population is affecting China's de-
mographic dividend. Second, much evidence shows China has been 
overinvesting in many sectors. Third, over the past 40 years of rapid 
economic growth in China, the impressive performance in total factor 
productivity has largely been attributed to resource allocative efﬁciency 
through labour mobility from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors. 
As the surplus labour force has become gradually absorbed by the ex-
pansion of secondary and tertiary sectors, mass labour migration has 
slowed, and the opportunity to enhance resource allocative efﬁciency 
has decreased. Various measures can be adopted to enhance the poten-
tial GDP growth rate, such as supplying more labour and improving 
productivity. While abolishing the one-child policy, so as to increase 
labour supply, and further opening up China's domestic market are 
positive initiatives, overall progress is very small. Institutional reforms, 
which are assumed to improve total factor productivity, are proceeding 
very slowly (Liu 2018).
Under such conditions, to further promote regional integration has 
become an important task. Although the key concept of this study is 
the microregionalism, studies based on macroregionalism can still be 
applied. The main reason is that the essence of the regionalism is very 
similar in both cases. For example, although the degree of integration 
varies, they generally include the abolishment of tariffs, and the abolish-
ment of restrictions on factor and commodity movements (Balassa 2013). 
Studies have found that economic integration can enhance growth. For 
example, for developed economies, closer integration can be achieved 
by increasing trade in goods or by increasing ﬂows of ideas. Either form 
of integration can increase the long-run rate of growth (Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer 1991). Using a data set of around 100 developing countries over 
1970–2004, Te Velde (2011) found that regional integration has a pos-
itive impact on growth in its members through the effects of increased 
trade and investment. 
Regarding the GBA, with the completion of the Hong Kong- 
Zhuhai–Macau Bridge and several other infrastructure projects, there 
will be signiﬁcantly increased connectivity amongst these 11 cities, pro-
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viding an engine of accelerated growth for the entire GBA. Increased 
connectivity can foster trade in goods and services and direct invest-
ments that did not exist before, thus adding new value (Lau 2018). 
Furthermore, the abolishment of legal and other barriers will also add 
new value. 
Future of the GBA
It is expected that the infrastructure facilities in the GBA will be more 
interconnected, and the GBA will be more integrated in the future in 
terms of goods, services, investment and people. As a result of this 
deeper integration, scientiﬁc and innovation activity will be further 
improved in the GBA. 
A. Infrastructure Interconnection and Sharing
The Outline states that there will be more infrastructure facilities within 
the GBA for improving interconnection and sharing. Table 4 shows recent 
and future developments of regional connectivity infrastructures.
TABLE 4. Development of Regional Connectivity Infrastructures for 
the GBA
Name Function Timeline
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–
Macau Bridge
Shortening the travel time of the approxi-
mately 42km from Hong Kong Port to Zhuhai 
Port and Macao Port to within 40 minutes
Finished in 
February 
2018
Guangzhou–Shen-
zhen–Hong Kong 
Express Rail Link
High-speed railway line that connects Beijing 
and Hong Kong (Kowloon) via Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen
Finished in 
September 
2018
Humen Second Bridge
Enhancing connection of Guangzhou and 
Dongguan
To roll out in 
2019
Guangzhou–Shantou 
Express Rail Link
Shortening the trip from Guangzhou to Shan-
tou to 90 minutes
To roll out in 
2020
Shenzhen–Zhongshan 
Corridor
Cutting the trip from Shenzhen to Zhongshan 
to 30 minutes
To roll out in 
Dec 2024
Source: Wong (2018); https://www.hzmb.gov.hk/ 
In particular, the 55km Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge, consist-
ing of the 12km Hong Kong Link Road, the 29.6km Main Bridge and 
the 13.4km Zhuhai Link Road, is a bridge and tunnel system consisting 
of a series of three cable-stayed bridges, an undersea tunnel and four 
artiﬁcial islands.11 It is the longest bridge-cum-tunnel sea crossing in 
the world. The total cost was RMB126.9 billion (equivalent to US$18.3 
billion) (Xinhua News, 2018).12 Figure 3 shows this bridge. 
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Furthermore, it is suggested that the GBA should strengthen the co-
ordination and sharing of infrastructures. For example, The GBA can 
maximize the usage of its airports, tunnels, bridges and seaports by 
following the example of New York and New Jersey (Lau 2018). The 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, formed in 1921, on be-
half of the states of New York and New Jersey, operates and maintains 
much of the regional transport infrastructure, including airports such 
as La Guardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Newark 
Liberty International Airport, Teterboro Airport, Stewart International 
Airport and Atlantic City International Airport, as well as other surface 
and seaborne transportation facilities. The GBA can establish a GBA 
Port Authority to manage all the infrastructure facilities in the area, or 
as suggested by Lau (2018), as the ﬁrst step just a GBA Airport Author-
ity to manage all the civil airports (or just Hong Kong and Shenzhen 
airports) in the area. 
Besides transportation infrastructure, it is expected that the GBA 
will also deepen its interconnection and sharing in information infra-
structure, such as by upgrading the internet broadband and creating a 
more standardized smart city for data sharing. A more interconnected 
energy supply system is also underway, such as through sharing the 
power grid and gas supply network. A more coordinated water usage 
system is also expected. 
B. A More Integrated GBA Market
Before the formal GBA, there have already been some mechanisms to 
help integrate the economies of this region. For example, the CEPA came 
FIGURE 3. The Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge
Source: Discover Hong Kong 
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into effect in January 2004 (Yang 2016). The CEPA consists of three parts: 
trade in goods, trade in services and trade and investment facilitation. 
In terms of trade in goods, about 90 per cent of Hong Kong's domestic 
exports to the mainland have enjoyed zero tariffs since January 2004. In 
terms of trade in services, the package is 'WTO-plus' because the conces-
sions go beyond China's World Trade Organization commitments. Hong 
Kong businesses will have priority in accessing the mainland market 
with lower thresholds, especially in a total of 18 service sectors includ-
ing banks, insurance, legal services, retail and professional services. 
The CEPA agreement represents a pioneering intervention by Chinese 
central government to coordinate cross-border economic integration 
more directly, while previously this process was mainly driven by 
informal mechanisms such as the market forces, the private sector and 
lower-level regional governments (Yang 2016). Besides the CEPA, there 
are also other mechanisms such as the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Innova-
tion Circle Agreement, signed in 2007, and the Hong Kong-Guangdong 
Co-operation Framework Agreement, signed in 2010.
According to the Outline, the free ﬂow of goods, services, investment 
and people will be further promoted. In order to enhance free trade, it 
is suggested to have a trusted authority within the GBA to certify the 
quality and safety of the goods (Lau 2018). In addition to the free ﬂow 
of goods, the free ﬂow of services will be further facilitated. For exam-
ple, Lau (2018) has suggested that courier delivery services should be 
opened across the whole GBA. Regarding investment, Hong Kong and 
Macau investors will be further granted special status in terms of market 
entry in the areas of ﬁnancial services, education, law and dispute reso-
lution, shipping, logistics, railway transportation, telecommunications, 
Chinese medicine, construction and related engineering in the GBA. 
The requirements in terms of qualiﬁcations and shareholdings will be 
further reduced or even cancelled. Regarding the free ﬂow of people, 
there will be further improvement in simpliﬁcation and automation of 
the entry/exit and customs processes within the GBA. The issues of 
professional qualiﬁcations, individual income tax and vehicle trafﬁc 
management will be further addressed too. However, there is a chal-
lenge in that the restrictions will be further lifted for Hong Kong and 
Macau residents to enjoy beneﬁts in Mainland China but not the other 
way around. For example, it is possible for middle school and preschool 
teachers from Hong Kong and Macau to work in the mainland part of 
the GBA. There is also a possibility that Hong Kong and Macau residents 
can apply for public service jobs in Mainland China. But to come from 
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the other way is not possible at this stage and may still be impossible 
in the near future. 
Furthermore, there will be more collaborations in R&D between Hong 
Kong, Macau and Mainland China. The Outline states that Hong Kong 
and Macau will be further integrated into China's national innovation 
system. Speciﬁcally, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Macau 
Science and Technology Innovation Corridor will be further promoted, 
and a big data centre for the GBA will be jointly established. Institutions 
from Hong Kong and Macau will be encouraged to apply for Mainland 
China's grants and funds. Lau (2018) predicted that Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen together could form a global innovation, venture investment, 
start-up and ﬁnancing hub in the GBA.
Concluding Remarks
On 18 February 2019, the central committee of Chinese ruling party and 
the Chinese government released the development plan Outline for the 
GBA. This study presents the most up-to-date analysis of the GBA, and 
contributes to the academic literature on microregionalism, city clusters 
and relevant stakeholders. 
The GBA consists of 11 cities, including Hong Kong, Macau and nine 
Mainland Chinese cities. Comparing the GBA to China (excluding Hong 
Kong and Macau), the GBA only accounts for 0.6 per cent by area and 
4.4 per cent by population but 9.4 per cent by GDP. Considering the 
GBA as a country, it would be ranked 123rd by area, 20th by population 
and 12th by GDP in the world. Furthermore, this study analyses four 
aspects of its signiﬁcance: further integrating Hong Kong and Macau 
into Mainland China, promoting the BRI, promoting economic structure 
upgrading and the Made in China 2025 programme, and enhancing 
economic growth. It is expected that in the future there will be more 
infrastructure interconnection and sharing within the GBA and that the 
GBA market will become more integrated. 
However, challenges remain for the future of the GBA. Generally 
speaking, costs could arise in the process of integration including, for 
example, the fact that gains could be unevenly distributed. As argued 
by Venables (2003), integration within a union composed of low-income 
members tends to lead to divergence of member (country) incomes. 
Moreover, there could be more conﬂicts resulting from more interactions 
between people. Integration may also lead to pushbacks from locals 
who are losers in the process. 
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Speciﬁcally, the main challenge is the integration of Hong Kong into 
Mainland China. For example, Mainland Chinese tourists have increased 
from 2.36 million, accounting for 21.0 per cent of total tourists visiting 
Hong Kong in 1997, to 51 million, accounting for 78.3 per cent in 2018.13 
However, mainland Chinese visitors' wealth, shopping activities, mo-
bility and even physical presence are now felt to be more parasitical, 
revolting and threatening in Hong Kong (Ip 2015). The resistance and 
hostility against the Chinese government and mainlanders has led to a 
new Hong Kong identity and new narratives about Hong Kong's po-
litical role in China. Deteriorating human rights records and tightened 
political control from Beijing since 2008 have aggravated the anti-China 
sentiments in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong people are becoming more 
sceptical of increased integration, and the political gap between China 
and Hong Kong is widening around the struggle for democracy (Ma 
2015). The Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests in 2019 show that 
Mainland–Hong Kong relations have entered an unprecedentedly dif-
ﬁcult period.  
There are also economic obstacles. For instance, there are three cur-
rencies within the GBA, namely, RMB (used in Mainland China), HK 
dollars and Macanese pataka (used in Macau). Under the current policy, 
funds from Mainland China can only be directly transferred offshore 
under the capital account with approval. China's capital account liber-
alization ground to a halt after its reform of mechanisms for setting the 
RMB central parity rate against the US dollar in 2015 (Liu 2016) and 
the following series of episodes of ﬁnancial turmoil until 2017. Since 
then, the Chinese authorities seem to have been very cautious towards 
policies that could lead to capital outﬂow. There should be more policy 
initiatives concerning capital ﬂow within the GBA including Hong Kong 
and Macau. Furthermore, as argued by Lau (2018), uniform and timely 
access to the correct information in a market is crucial for the efﬁciency 
of the market system. This means ready access to the internet is essential. 
However, access to the internet is restricted within Mainland China. 
How to resolve this issue needs to be addressed by Chinese ofﬁcials.
In essence, the integration of Hong Kong into China is all to do with 
Beijing's political encroachment in Hong Kong's affairs, and a more 
liberal market economy with rule of law, private property rights and 
respect of contracts in a largely state-led economy. There are huge chal-
lenges ahead for the Chinese authorities.
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1  CCTV 2018. 'Ba yuegangao dawanqu jianshe zhuajin zhuashi banhao (We will 
do a good job in developing the GBA)'. http://china.huanqiu.com/article/2018-
10/13380877.html?agt=15422 (in Chinese).
2  Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 
3  21CNH 2018. 'Yuegangao dawanqu jianshe lingdao xiaozu jiangkai shouci 
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meeting)'. 21st-Century Business Herald. http://money.163.com/18/0814/13/
DP63177G002580S6.html (in Chinese).
4  Xinhua News 2019. 'Hanzheng zhuchi zhaokai yuegangao dawanqu jianshe lingdao 
xiaozu huiyi (Han Zheng presided over the GBA Leading Committee Meeting)'. 
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019-03/01/content_5369786.htm (in Chi-
nese).
5  Kliman, Daniel, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee and Zack Cooper. 'Grading China's Belt 
and Road. Center for a New American Security.' April 2019. https://s3.amazonaws.
com/ﬁles.cnas.org/CNAS+Report_China+Belt+and+Road_ﬁnal.pdf 
6  Source: Wind Info. Accessed from https://www.wind.com.cn/en/ 
7  FSDC (Financial Service Development Council), 2018. 'Overview of Hong Kong 
Financial Services Industry'. http://www.fsdc.org.hk/sites/default/ﬁles/Overv
iew%20of%20HK%20Financial%20Services%20Industry_E.pdf
8  WTW (Willis Towers Watson) 2018. 'Asia Insurance Market Report 2018'. https://
www.willistowerswatson.com/-/media/WTW/PDF/Insights/2018/02/asia-insur-
ance-market-report-2018.pdf
9  RG (Research Group) 2019. 'Digital Economy and Talent Development in the Guang-
dong- Hong Kong- Macau Greater Bay Area'. https://economicgraph.linkedin.
com/content/dam/me/economicgraph/zh-cn/pdfs/digital-economy-talent-de-
velopment-report-china-greater-bay-area-updated.pdf
10  China News 2018. 'Yuegangao dawanqu kechuang xingdong wunian jihua youwang 
jinqi shishi (Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao and Greater Bay Area Science and 
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Technology Action Five-Year Plan is expected to be implemented in the near future)'. 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/07-27/8582013.shtml (in Chinese).
11  Source: https://www.hzmb.gov.hk/ 
12  Xinhua News, 23 October 2018. 'World's longest cross-sea bridge opens, integrat-
ing China's Greater Bay Area'. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/23/
c_137553194.htm
13  Data source: Hong Kong Tourism Board, Wind.
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